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*ISAAC SATANOW: METAMORPHOSIS OF JUDAIC VALUES*

Isaac Satanow (Satanov) (1732-1804) is one of the major writers of early Hebrew Haskalah in Germany. Few studies have been devoted to his life or to his diversified writings. His literary activities coincide with the beginning of the important process of the destruction of traditional Judaic values and some fundamental concepts of classical Jewish civilization. It is ironic that Satanow's prolific literary endeavors, which were, for the most part, traditional in nature, also provided the tools for the erosion of the accepted tenets of Judaism. Satanow published new editions of traditional texts: prayerbooks, Scriptures, and medieval texts, notably of Maimonides. These publications were marked by the author's personal touch and helped in furthering Enlightenment within Judaism. His interpretation and treatment of the prayerbooks and Scriptures were controversial, at times innovative. The publishing of Maimonides' writings, for instance, assisted in the dissemination of rationalism and free thought. Another aspect of Satanow's writings involved the employment of traditional styles and genres, in his pseudo-*Zohar*, the pseudo-polemical writings which attempted to imitate Judah Halevi's *Kuzari*, and his neo-biblical version of wisdom literature. Some of these genres were intentionally clothed in an ancient form but the content was contemporary, controversial and quite innovative.

The neo-biblical writing, in the form of belles lettres, gave expression to the process of the breaking down of the fundamentals of the Jewish *Weltanschauung* and the basic beliefs of the Jewish individual. It should be pointed out that not only did Satanow's writings reflect the situation in a literary fashion, but they also helped in shaping this process, in advocating the new ideas of the Enlightenment and in disseminating them.

Satanow's *Mishle 'Asaf*, to which this study is devoted,<sup>1</sup> contains — like biblical wisdom literature — observations and comments on the world, man and God, and the interrelationship between them. It expresses the author's praise of wisdom and the wise, and his condemnation of *Siklut* (foolishness) and fools. It also expresses his praise of good manners, meritorious traits and ethics as well as his recommendations for correcting and improving them when they are deficient. As a result of its contents and form, this pseudo-wisdom literature reflects in a crystallized manner the basic tenets of the ideology of the Berlin Haskalah, highlighting a significant trend toward a metamorphosis of accepted Judaic values. A study in depth of this modern version of the pseudo-biblical wisdom literature is indispensable to the understanding of Haskalah literature and of its intellectual milieu. For Satanow was one of the most important representatives — and perhaps also one of the most colorful figures — of that milieu. His importance lies in the role he played in the Hebrew Enlightenment, and in the peculiar or even unique nature of his writings. In addition, there is another aspect of the Satanow phenomenon which calls for special attention. It is, to my mind, the negative attitude that Satanow's contemporaries expressed toward him<sup>2</sup> — very much as they did toward his colleague-in-arms rabbi Saul Berlin<sup>3</sup> — which somehow penetrated the so-called objective historical studies of the period.<sup>4</sup> A negative portrayal of his personality, I suspect, led to a negative evaluation of his works. A re-examination of his works, I believe, should lead to a re-evaluation of Satanow and his literary endeavors.<sup>5</sup>

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The following three observations, which shed light on the uniqueness of the works under study, have direct bearing on the understanding of the ideology of the Haskalah.

a. The biblical style which Satanow adopted in order to convey his ideas and feelings possesses inherent characteristics that serve his purpose well. It bears the mark of antiquity, for one, and as a result appears to be authentic and assumes the stamp of authority — the authority of the holy Scriptures. Through literary devices such as repetition and parallelism, the author supports that apparent authority. Satanow's pseudo-biblical text also possesses an epigrammatic-definitive tone that presents the text as the infallible words of truth and wisdom. This pseudo wisdom-literature style is, moreover, direct in its approach and, like a slogan, it calls for action. Above all, it is didactic.

There is a subtle dichotomy in the work, and the author is unable to bridge it — a dichotomy between two completely different worlds:<sup>6</sup> the theocentric world of the Bible and the anthropocentric world of the Haskalah. As a result, the reader is faced with a contrast between the pseudo-classical form and the modern contents — or rather the spirit of the contents — and the underlying tone of skepticism, *pli'ah* (marveling, amazement) and probing as irreplaceable criteria. This contrast is magnified by Satanow's attempts to reconcile irreconcilable elements.

b. The second observation concerns the relationship which Satanow established between the text of *Mishle 'Asaf* and its commentary.<sup>7</sup> Whereas he actually authored both, he attributed the pseudo-biblical verses to an ancient Levite, 'Asaf ben Brekyahu, and the commentary to himself.<sup>8</sup> Parenthetically, this literary device led to an interesting comment: "All plagiarists steal from others and attribute (whatever they copy) to themselves, whereas this one (namely, Satanow) steals from himself and attributes (that which he steals) to others."<sup>9</sup> Curiously enough, it was none other than Satanow who made the statement about himself. The commentary, in a way, authenticates the text as ancient and sacred, for it follows the traditional Jewish pattern of the Scriptures and their commentary. It allows the author to interpret a sacred-oriented text in a secular fashion, a technique which is also employed by rabbi Saul Berlin in his *Besamim Rosh*.<sup>10</sup> And it enables him to create the illusion of detachment of the author of the exegesis from the composer of the text. Many students of Satanow were not cognizant of this relationship between the text and the commentary. This fact resulted in the discrepancies found in the scholars' evaluation of *Mishle 'Asaf* both as a literary work as well as a source of appreciation of the ideology of the Hebrew Haskalah in Germany.<sup>11</sup>

c. The third observation, interrelated with the other two, is concerned with Satanow's declared methodology in the presentation of his ideas and with the techniques he utilizes to propagandize the ideals of the Enlightenment. Satanow is aware of the pitfalls in presenting new and revolutionary ideas. His objective is not to shock and surprise his readers, but rather to teach and persuade. Therefore, he introduces an idea in a manner acceptable to his reader; at first, it appears as though he agrees with the traditional view. In due course he airs his critical and, at times, heretical views in the open. This technique, which I have also detected in the writings of Saul Berlin,<sup>12</sup> is reminiscent of the talmudic *Hava 'amina*. Interestingly enough, Satanow himself explains this technique in an obscure commentary to one of the verses: "It is appropriate for the healer of souls to agree with them (with the fools) and then to transform them (. . .) little by little until he would place them on Truth and Justice, for they would not accept a

remedy from the healer (doctor) who would suddenly show them the Truth which is in opposition to what he (they) imagine.”<sup>13</sup> Against the background of these observations the ensuing discussion, I think, becomes more meaningful.

The ideology of Haskalah, as found in the books under study, may be classified in four categories: a. Ideas and ideals permeated by the spirit of European Enlightenment; b. Ideas and ideals which bear the distinct mark of deism; c. Practical comments regarding contemporary Judaism; d. Subtle allegations which, unlike those in the first three categories, are subconsciously expressed; thus if our interpretation of them is correct, they may serve as a vital indicator of the underlying ideological currents which shaped and formed the *Weltanschauung* of Haskalah.

A word of caution: the above categories are offered for convenience only and are in no way conclusive. The first category is by no means an entity completely detached from medieval Jewish thought. Enlightenment is indebted to medieval philosophy;<sup>14</sup> similarly, the Hebrew *maskilim* were under the influence of medieval Jewish thought, especially of Maimonides.<sup>15</sup> Thus, although Satanow employs the term *Hokmah* (wisdom) in a pseudo-biblical context, one suspects that his concept of *Hokmah* is not identical with that found in the wisdom-literature. Surely, one significant aspect of the biblical *Hokmah* is wanting here; it is *Hokmah* in the sense of proper religious conduct. To Satanow, *Hokmah* is knowledge, mainly secular knowledge, as well as sciences and philosophy.<sup>16</sup> Thus he is closer to medieval Jewish philosophy than to the Bible in the usage of that term.<sup>17</sup>

There is a distinct feature about the *Hokmah* which Satanow attempts to portray, a feature typical of the age of Hebrew Enlightenment. We note the many attempts by Satanow to present *Hokmah* — secular knowledge — and *Yir'ah* — the fear of God — as complementary terms.<sup>18</sup> At times he uses the term *Torah* for the same purpose.<sup>19</sup> Although *Yir'ah* and *Torah* are two different terms, in our context they both refer to the world of the sacred. They denote an unshakable faith in God, a biblical kind of trust in Him which sounds rather anachronistic to the *maskil*. He views *Torah* and *Hokmah* as “twin sisters.”<sup>20</sup> In his early writings Satanow shows the compatibility of Judaism and the secular sciences.<sup>21</sup>

Understandably, reason is regarded by Satanow, like his fellow *maskilim*, as one of the ideals of his age.<sup>22</sup> On behalf of reason, Satanow wages a campaign against the unenlightened who would insist on separation of traditional Judaism from reason. In order to contradict this contention, Satanow endeavors to show, in addition to the compatibility of wisdom and Judaism, the interdependence of the two. He who denies wisdom is in effect denying God in his view; and he who hates wisdom actually hates God; the foes of God are viewed as the foes of wisdom.<sup>23</sup> Satanow maintains that love of God and hatred of wisdom are contradictory,<sup>24</sup> and complains about the unenlightened who possess *Yir'ah* alone; they are deficient, in his view, in the true and complete knowledge of God. By detaching *Yir'ah* from wisdom, the unenlightened are implying that the *Torah* is geared only to the unwise.<sup>25</sup> Needless to say, this implication is completely rejected by the Hebrew *maskil*.

In spite of Satanow's endeavors to show first the compatibility of wisdom and Judaism, and then the interdependence of the two, the careful reader of *Mishle Asaf* cannot escape the conclusion that this *maskil*, perhaps unknowingly and subconsciously, is advocating the utter subordination of Judaism to secular knowledge, and the dependence of the former on the latter. Only via secular

knowledge, in his view, can man achieve the knowledge of God.<sup>26</sup> This is a clear statement of the subordination of religion to man's reason, which characteristically is one of the dogmas of both Enlightenment and deism.

In the mind of this enlightened Jew, *'Emunah* — faith, or belief — functions under the supreme rule of wisdom. It is by *Hokmah* — i.e., human reason — that faith is checked for its authenticity and truth.<sup>27</sup> Man, then, is the ultimate factor in determining the religious truth, not ecclesiastical authority or scriptural tradition. Thus Satanow arrives at the end of moderate Enlightenment, marking, as it were, also the beginning of his more extreme views regarding religion.

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It appears that deism exerted a great influence on Satanow's views of religion in general and of Judaism and Christianity in particular. This should not surprise anyone, for deism has been a major factor in the formation of the ideals of Hebrew Haskalah.<sup>28</sup> As I have pointed out elsewhere, Moses Mendelssohn, too, had been under the direct influence of the deistic movement.<sup>29</sup> This, however, does not necessarily make any of them a full-fledged deist.

Like all deists, Satanow acknowledges the necessity of religion to the individual and, by implication, to society.<sup>30</sup> It is clear, however, that he does not have in mind any religion but the religion of reason, the religion of Enlightenment. Christianity, in his view, is not such a religion, for Christianity is beyond comprehension.<sup>31</sup> Its followers proclaim that their religion is above and beyond reason, that is to say, superior to reason and not governed by it; any investigation (*Ḥaqirah*) into it is dangerous, they say.<sup>32</sup> To a *maskil* like Satanow, whose banner is "reason," such a religion is as unacceptable as "merchandise which had not been checked whether it is good or bad."<sup>33</sup> He further criticizes the illogical promises of rewards by Christianity to its followers. The religion of reason (*ha-Dat ha-ḥakamah*, literally, the wise religion) — Satanow writes — would grant only proper spiritual reward in accordance with the nature of reality.<sup>34</sup>

By contrast, the Jewish religion is portrayed over and over again as a religion of reason; actually, as the religion of reason which the Enlightenment and deism aspired to espouse. "The true Torah of God," he writes, "would under no circumstance contradict common sense" (*ha-Sekel ha-Yashar*).<sup>35</sup> As a matter of fact, the Torah itself — unlike in other religions — commands its followers to probe logically the truth of its ideas.<sup>36</sup> Other religions cannot withstand an examination by reason, therefore they have been forced to proclaim that they — the religions — are superior to reason. Satanow emphasizes that in essence the Torah is to be understood in a simple, non-mysterious way;<sup>37</sup> one can almost hear him say "Judaism Not Mysterious," as indeed the deist Toland was trying to portray his deistic Christianity.<sup>38</sup> In a blunt assault on Christianity, Satanow attributes unenlightened thoughts among the Jews and in Judaism to their alleged Christian origins; *Galut*, exile, brought about this negative influence of Christianity upon Judaism.<sup>39</sup>

This attitude toward Christianity and Judaism, attacking the former while defending the latter, was manifested previously by Mendelssohn. I think that the same viewpoints of European Enlightenment that had provoked Mendelssohn's views, were also the driving powers behind Satanow's exposition.<sup>40</sup> As in the case of the latter, it is Satanow's intellectual manner of advocating the adoption by the Jews of western civilization as presented by the Enlightenment. At the same

time he insists on rejecting Christianity (which is part of that civilization), and retaining the Jews' adherence to Judaism.

The same critical view of the history of religion found in the deistic literature is prevalent in Satanow's *Mishle 'Asaf*. Religion is no longer a sacred "Holy of Holies," as it were, but rather a phenomenon which should be evaluated as a human phenomenon in human terms. Satanow strikes a familiar note when he speaks about religious hatred (sin'at ha-Dat, the hatred of religion). Religion is depicted as being the major cause for the animosity that exists among the various nations professing different faiths. "No hatred is comparable to religious hatred," he writes.<sup>41</sup> He describes the bloody massacres performed in the name of God.<sup>42</sup> Like the deists, he blames the priests for arousing religious hatred.<sup>43</sup> This idea is magnified when Satanow places it in a Jewish context, namely, the blood accusations and the massacres of Jews. Again, the Christian and pagan priests are blamed for these iniquities.<sup>44</sup>

As in the case of the deistic attack on the positive religion, Satanow's almost macabre depiction of religion is purposely presented so as to introduce some values which are part and parcel of his Enlightenment ideology. The basis of his presentation is the recognition of the relativity of all religions and the understanding that there is no way to prove that any given religion is true and all the others are necessarily false.<sup>45</sup> To put it in Satanow's own words: "Most of the religious ideas are based on suppositions which cannot be proven (. . .) therefore there is no conclusive decision as to one religion's authenticity over another."<sup>46</sup> An echo of Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* can be discerned in these phrases.

Satanow advocates religious tolerance and religious humanism as befitting the age of Enlightenment; they comprise the variants which prove the authenticity of the proverbial true ring (in Lessing's play).<sup>47</sup>

Rejection of miracles is, generally speaking, a major preoccupation of the deistic writers; it is to be regarded as one of the characteristic ideas of the period.<sup>48</sup> Satanow warns against false miracles; he does consider as authentic those miracles performed by the prophets of God and "His great followers."<sup>49</sup> Typical of the Jewish *maskilim*, Satanow embraces the deistic rejection of Christian and pagan miracles as false while approving of the miracles which were related in the Bible and the Talmud.<sup>50</sup> The same treatment is found in the writings of Mendelssohn.<sup>51</sup> However, in order to fit his contention to his philosophy of Enlightenment, Satanow employs a device which is contradictory to and inconsistent with his *a priori* belief in reason. He utilizes a term, "ta'alumot ḥokmah," (secrets of wisdom, based on *Job*, 11:6) to denote the existence of unnatural phenomena which are beyond the comprehension of human reason yet are not contrary to reason.<sup>52</sup> Satanow seems to accept John Locke's distinction between that which is contrary to reason and that which is above reason.<sup>53</sup> It is a typical concession which a Jewish *maskil* has to make in order to harmonize Judaism with the ideas of the Enlightenment.

One of the characteristics of the thought of the age was the attitude of its writers toward tradition.<sup>54</sup> In *Mishle 'Asaf* Satanow expresses the deistic disrespect for tradition and its axiomatic authority. In Jewish heritage one notes the distinction between *Rishonim* and *'Aḥaronim* (the venerable early sages, and the more recent *halakic* scholars, respectively). Repeatedly and laboriously, Satanow endeavors to remove the shackles of this traditional concept. "Not all *Rishonim* would possess wisdom," he writes, "and not all *'Aḥaronim* (—) foolishness."<sup>55</sup> The past, then, should not be venerated uncritically because of its antiquity, neither should any religious custom be held as obligatory just because

it has been transmitted to us by previous generations.<sup>56</sup> The criterion of deism is thus proposed by Satanow: “Beḥan ’amitam”<sup>57</sup> (examine their authenticity).

When it suits his purpose, however, Satanow has no hesitations in reversing his views of *Rishonim* and *’Aḥaronim*. In order to support the desire of the majority of the *maskilim* to lessen the burden of secondary customs and decrees instituted in recent generations by the *’Aḥaronim*, he pays homage to the *Rishonim*. They were the ones who could deduce new religious laws because of their closeness to the origin of Judaism. This is definitely not the case with the late religious authorities.<sup>58</sup> Very cleverly, Satanow utilizes one of the most venerated talmudic phrases concerning tradition and the past in the furtherance of his ideas. “Im harishonim kivne ’anashim ’anahnu kaḥamorim” (if the first ones [forefathers] are like human beings, we are like donkeys). Indeed we are like donkeys, says this *maskil* sarcastically, for we carry the abundance of laws which they load upon us as though these laws are divine precepts.<sup>59</sup> Not knowing for sure who the ambivalent “they” are, the reader may conclude that that pronoun indeed refers to the *Rishonim*; thus Satanow alludes to the abolishment of well-established, venerated religious laws and ordinances.

Of the other ideas and ideals of Enlightenment found in *Mishle ’Asaf* it is worth mentioning the emphasis on morality as the essence of religion, and the futility and impropriety of religious coercion.<sup>60</sup>

Regarding the third category, namely, that of comments geared directly toward certain phenomena in contemporary Judaism, it should be noted that this work by Satanow, as could be expected of a didactic tract, elucidates the major issues of the Haskalah. Thus, we find many utterances critical of the *piyyuṭim* and *seliḥot* (liturgical poems and penitential prayers, respectively), of *pilpul* (casuistry), and of *ta’aniyyot* and *siggufim* (fasting and self-affliction, respectively).<sup>61</sup> He discusses *Ṭa’ame Ha-mitzvot*, the reasons for the precepts,<sup>62</sup> and expresses his strong belief that his coreligionists have been in complete darkness as far as the distinction between the essential and the trivial in Judaism. The strict and disproportionate observance of the trivialities of Judaism has led to the neglect of its essentials, according to Satanow. The concept of *seyag* (*halakic* fence to guard the essentials) — a fundamental concept in traditional Judaism — is challenged.<sup>63</sup> Satanow holds the view, as did other *maskilim*, that the abundance of *seyagim* does not serve as a guarding fence anymore, but rather as a heavy burden which needs unloading. In the process, one unloads both the trivial and unimportant customs as well as the essentials and nucleus of Judaism.<sup>64</sup> “Qalah ka-ḥamurah” (minor injunction is as obligatory as a major one) is no longer held as an appropriate concept in the Judaism of the Enlightenment. While Satanow advocates the removal of the unessentials of Judaism, he does not hesitate to suggest the adoption of European customs and practices — although none has a direct bearing on religion — as had been proposed by other *maskilim*.<sup>65</sup>

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Our discussion so far has concentrated on conscious attempts on the part of the author to propagate in a didactic manner the world-view of Enlightenment in its Hebrew Haskalah attire. In addition, I have detected some subconscious phrases which manifest the underlying changes between traditional Judaism and the kind of Judaism envisioned by the Hebrew *maskilim*.

In spite of Satanow’s apparent efforts to harmonize between *Ḥokmah* and *Yir’ah*, as discussed above, the inescapable conclusion is that these efforts are

made out of a subconscious feeling that the two, namely, wisdom or secular knowledge and the fear of God, are incompatible. Satanow struggles to propose these two entities as existing side by side and complementing one another; yet his terminology suggests a complete dichotomy. He couples *Zedaqah* with *'Emunah* (righteousness and faith) on the one hand, and *Hokmah* and *'Emet* (wisdom and truth) on the other. Thus, subtly and perhaps unknowingly, he arrives at a two-fold dichotomy, the commentary revealing its clue: a. Righteousness and faith (commentary: *Yir'ah*) are on a different plain from wisdom and truth; wisdom, then, is regarded as a manifestation of truth. b. The other side of the coin is the dichotomy of faith and truth (Another distinction between faith and truth is found three years later in Schnaber's book).<sup>66</sup> As a result of Satanow's inherent emphasis on wisdom and truth in *Mishle 'Asaf*, one arrives at the conclusion that faith, as an entity by itself — unlike wisdom and truth — is not on par with the Enlightenment. Classical Judaism and Enlightenment do not go together. In a similar vein, Satanow declares that the observance of *mitzvot* and the existence of wisdom are contradictory.<sup>67</sup> He endeavors to compromise between the two, saying that they exist on two different plains, yet he is unaware that this answer does not harmonize the two but creates a dichotomy. It appears that his many attempts at *Ta'ame Ha-mitzvot* should be regarded as efforts on his part to apply traditional medieval thinking in the context of secularistic Enlightenment. Surely, he would like very much for the Enlightenment to accept what appears to be a Judaism founded upon reason — the traditional reasoning of *Ta'ame Ha-mitzvot* — yet after these exercises in futility, his thinking implies a feeling that he has failed.

Similarly, a lengthy discussion of the trust in God (*Bitṭaḥon ba-Shem*) — typifying the unshakable, total faith in the God of Israel and a complete trust in divine providence — leads to the feeling that a totality of trust in God as known in traditional Judaism is non-existent in modern times.<sup>68</sup>

*Yir'at ha-Shem* and *'Ahavat Ha-Shem* (fear of God and love of God) representing two major concepts of traditional Judaism, are subject to a latter-day interpretation by this *maskil*. Satanow's discussion of the fear of God elucidates the theme of the limitations that confront an individual who desires to fear God as a result of human limitation in understanding God. Since these limitations are God-given, as it were, an individual — according to the Hebrew *maskil* — is not to blame for either his limitations or, as a result, for the lack of his fear of God.<sup>69</sup> Underlying Satanow's discussion, I think, is the notion that fear of God, in its classical meaning of total belief in Him, is not obligatory in the age of Enlightenment.

His treatment of *'Ahavat ha-Shem*, too, represents in my opinion a complete break from traditional Judaism. Satanow maintains that pure love, love for love's sake, sort of *'Ahavah li-shemah*, is non-existent. All love is love with an ulterior motive according to Satanow. Even love of God is not love for its own sake. One loves God because one loves oneself, and one would like to be rewarded for this love materially and spiritually in this world and in the world to come.<sup>70</sup> One can note, by contrast, an echo of the traditional concept of love in Judaism, as expressed in the *Ethics of the Fathers*: *'Ahavah she-'enah teluyah bedavar*.<sup>71</sup> Thus we are faced with a new concept of the love of God which, I think, is nourished by Enlightenment. Moreover, it is evident that the center of gravity is no longer God, but man and the utilitarian aspects of his existence.

The superiority of human reason and the subordination of religion to it have been previously discussed. I also elaborated upon the apparent contradiction

between this attitude toward reason and Satanow's allowance for "secrets of wisdom," believed not to contradict reason but rather to be above it. Undoubtedly this contradiction stems from his desire to reject Christianity and Christian miracles, but at the same time to explain his acceptance of Judaism and its miracles. However, it is apparent elsewhere that reason reigns supreme even in matters the investigation of which traditional Judaism discouraged. Traditionally it has been held that "be-mufla mi-mka 'al tidrosh"<sup>72</sup> (you should not probe that which is unknown to you). One is advised not to examine the unknown in the realm of the divine. This traditional attitude harbors within it: a. an acknowledgement of the limitation of human reason, and b. an all-encompassing faith in God. This is unacceptable to Satanow. His skepticism is clear; no longer is the divine unknown regarded as taboo.<sup>73</sup> His Judaism of the Enlightenment is in many significant ways a far cry from traditional Judaism.

Another idea in his writing which appears rather traditionally oriented on the surface is actually an expression of Satanow's subconscious attitude toward religion. He warns repeatedly against succumbing to doubts and skepticism resulting from reason and investigation. He further comes out with beautiful poetic expressions against forsaking or even betraying Judaism under the spells of "Mevukot" — doubts.<sup>74</sup> However, one cannot avoid reaching the conclusion that in his writing, "Mevukot" has become a value, an asset which the *maskil* should aspire to attain. Doubts, skepticism and questioning are a springboard for knowledge and wisdom.<sup>75</sup> It is apparent that the old, assuring value of *Biṭṭahon ba-Shem*, unquestioning trust, is not only questioned, but replaced by its antithetical concept, namely, skepticism, as a desired value.

In conclusion: in spite of his use of biblical style and traditional concepts, many of the ideas expressed in the books under study can be traced to the Enlightenment and to deism. Although it appears superficially as if Satanow is endeavoring to harmonize religion and Enlightenment, and Judaism and secularism, there is ample proof that the latter outweigh the former. Behind all his reasoning we have found significant indications of a meaningful break between Satanow's Judaism of the Enlightenment and the Judaism of old.

#### NOTES

An earlier version of this study was presented at the Annual Meeting of The National Association of Professors of Hebrew in American Institutes of Higher Learning, New York, October 27, 1970, and was previously published in *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, XXV (3, 1973).

1. For the present study I have limited my discussion to the first two volumes of *Mishle 'Asaf* (Proverbs of 'Asaf), published in Berlin in 1789 and 1792, while excluding the other two volumes, *Zemiroi 'Asaf* (Songs of 'Asaf) (Berlin, 1793), and *Megillat Ḥasidim* (Scroll of the Pious) (Berlin, 1802).

The most comprehensive study, though by no means conclusive, on Satanow's *Mishle 'Asaf*, his personality, and his place in Hebrew literature, is Shmuel Werses' article "On Isaac Satanow and His Work 'Mishle Asaf,'" *Tarbiṣ*, XXXII (No. 4, Tamuz, 1963), pp. 370-392 (Hebrew). Werses' main contribution is his thesis regarding the relation between the text and the commentary of *Mishle 'Asaf*, his exposition of Satanow's literary techniques, and his use of autobiographical material scattered overtly and covertly in Satanow's books. An important discussion is found also in H.N. Shapira, *Toledot Hasifrut H'ivrit Ha-ḥadashah* (History of Modern Hebrew Literature) (Tel Aviv, 1967<sup>2</sup>), pp. 317-333. Isaac Eisenstein-Barzilay uses some examples from *Mishle 'Asaf* in his significant article "The Ideology of the Berlin Haskalah," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, XXV (1956), p. 4-5. See the comments on the relation of the text and the commentary in note 66 below. Regarding the methodological question as to whether there is a unified system of thought and its relation to the style of presentation, consult Werses' above-mentioned article, pp. 374-375, 382-384. In



addition, consult my other articles on Satanow: "Clarifying Some Bibliographical Question in Isaac Satanow's Works," *Kirjath Sepher*, XLIX (No. 3, June 1974) pp. 436-439 (Hebrew); and *Isaac Satanow — A Heretic and a Believer in the Beginning of Hebrew Haskalah Literature in Germany* (Beer Sheva, 1973) (mimeographed; Hebrew), to be published shortly in *Akshav*. The latter study deals with all of Satanow's works.

2. In a review of the first three volumes of *Mishle 'Asaf* in *Hame'assef* by a critic bearing the pseudonym Heyman (cf. 1 *Chronicles*, 15:19), the writer exposes Satanow as the author of the said books. The reviewer is quite critical of Satanow for misleading the public to believe that he had discovered an ancient manuscript while having written it himself. He further accuses Satanow of being untruthful and conceited while preaching truthfulness and modesty (*Hame'assef*, VII [No. 3, 1796], pp. 251-266). In sixteen pages of a detailed analysis containing quoted verses from the reviewed books, the critic lashes out at Satanow for his figurative language which does not make sense to the critic; Satanow, he writes, did not understand, in effect, the meaning of certain biblical words. The criticism, at times, assumes a personal tone as in the references to Satanow's place of origin (Satanov, in the province of Podolia in Poland — *ibid.*, p. 257). Satanow fought back by publishing a book entitled *Minḥat Biqqurim* (An Offering, or: Gift, of Criticism) (Berlin, 1797), whose author is marked as Doctor Schönemann, Satanow's own son. The authorship of the book is rather doubtful; however, it is safe to assume that it remained within the Satanow family. In *Minḥat Biqqurim* the identity of the critic of Satanow's work is revealed; it is no other than the editor of *Hame'assef*, Aaron Wolfssohn, who is said to have suspected Satanow of publishing an attack on the journal. Thus the animosity is said to have been a personal one, and the author of *Minḥat Biqqurim* answers in kind by exposing what he considers as Wolfssohn's own linguistic ignorance in his book *Avqalion* (*ibid.*, p. 28a). In turn, the editors of *Hame'assef* continue the exchange with a review of *Minḥat Biqqurim*, too (*Hame'assef*, VII [No. 4, 1797], pp. 395-399).

Other contemporary negative reaction to Satanow appeared in Ṭuyvahu Feder's *Lahat Ha-ḥerev* (The Flaming Sword) (Vilna, 1866; First edition: 1804), p. 28, and in Moses Mendelsohn (of Hamburg). *Pne Tevel* (Face of the World) (Amsterdam, 1872), p. 252. The latter is the author of the now famous saying on Satanow. "He is half a believer and half a heretic" (Hu ḥaḥi min va-ḥaḥi ma'amin). Another such saying on Satanow was contributed by the Hebrew *maskil* Ben-Ze'ev: "His book contains innovations and benefits; however, the innovations are not beneficial, and the benefits are not new" (Yesh besifro hadashot umo'ilot, 'ack ha-hadashot 'enan mo'ilot vehamo 'ilot 'enan ḥadashot) — Judah Ben-Ze'ev, *'Ozar Hashorashim* [Treasure of Roots] (Vienna, 1807), p. 8, in the introduction (my pagination).

3. See my articles "Some Notes on the Nature of Saul Berlin's Writings," *The Journal of Hebraic Studies*, I(2, 1970), pp. 47-48; and "The Religious Reforms of 'Traditionalist' Rabbi Saul Berlin (A Chapter in the History of the Struggle of Hebrew Haskalah in Germany for the Revival of Judaism)," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, XLII (1971), pp. 1-23 (Hebrew).
4. Franz Delitzsch, *Zur Geschichte der jüdischen Poësie* (Leipzig, 1836), p. 115, depicts Satanow as follows: "Unter dem polnischen Kaftan, über den sein Bart herabwallte, trug er die feinste Kleidung eines deutschen *petit maître* (. . .)." M.H. Letteris criticizes Satanow harshly for his edition of Ephraim Luzzatto's *'Elleh Bne Ha-ne'urim* (under the title *Ool Shaḥal*) in his introduction to Luzzatto's *'Elleh Bne Hane'urim* (These are the Youths) (Vienna, 1839), Cf. Naphtali Ben-Menahem's article on Satanow's edition of *Ool Shaḥal* in *Kirjath Sepher*, XLIV (1969), pp. 560-562, in which the author claims Satanow forged one poem and attributed it to Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto. Zunz criticizes Satanow's edition of *Seliḥot*, summarized: "Doctrinäre Sprachverbesserer sind keine Textkritiker" (L. Zunz, *Die Ritus des synagogalen Gottesdienstes* [Berlin, 1859], pp. 231-233). Zvi Graetz, *Divre Yeme Ha-yehudim* (History of the Jews), IX (Warsaw, [1904]), pp. 89-90: "He like to disguise himself and to cheat the public in such forgeries (. . .) he was a man who was not truthful by nature." J.L. Kantor, "Dor Hame'assefim" (The Generation of the Writers of *Hame'assef*), *Hame'assef*, supplement of *Ha'asif* (1886), p. 23-24 (following Graetz). Israel Zinberg, *Toledot Sifrut Yisra'el* (History of the Literature of Israel), V (Merḥavyah, Israel, 1954), pp. 119-120, 122, 125. Zinberg calls Satanow light-minded and a forger. Yaacov Rabinovitz, *Maslule Sifrut* (Paths of Literature), I (Jerusalem, 1971), p. 16 (originally published in 1939), also regards him as a forger.
5. A significant contribution to the subject matter is Werses' article cited in note 1.
6. Cf. H.N. Shapira, *Toledot Ha-sifrut Ha-ivrit Ha-ḥadashah*, pp. 317-318.
7. Cf. Werses, "On Isaac Satanow," p. 371. Werses points out, and rightly so, that Satanow's ideological outlook is revealed authentically in the commentary accompanying the proverbial text in *Mishle 'Asaf*.

8. Satanow, *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 2 (my pagination), in the approbation attributed to five rabbis, although it had been authored by Satanow himself.
9. Satanow, *Quntres Mi-Sefer Ha-Zohar Hibura Tinyana* (Pamphlet of the Book of 'Zohar,' Second Composition) (Berlin, 1783), p. 2 (my pagination), in the approbation penned by the author himself. (Joseph Klausner, *Historiah Shel Ha-Sifrut Ha-'Ivrit Ha-ḥadashah* (History of Modern Hebrew Literature), I (Jerusalem, 1960), p. 168, believes in the authenticity of the approbation. However, it is not likely that a respectable rabbi would use humorous style, and that he would express distinct Satanovian ideas which could be found also in *Minḥat Biqqurim*). The second rabbinic approbation also hints that the purported ancient manuscript had been composed by a contemporary writer (*Quntres*, p. 2). Similarly, we have such references in the approbations to the first volume of *Mishle 'Asaf*: "(. . .) it is not known who composed it (the purported ancient manuscript) for the said Rabbi Isaac (Satanow) says that indeed he had found it (. . .) and it appears that truly it is a parable and perhaps Rabbi Isaac himself had composed it as was the case in his work *'Imre Binah* (Words of Understanding [Berlin, 1784] [. . .] in conclusion, Asaf had not signed [—authored] it" [*Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 2]).
10. Saul Berlin, *Besamim Rosh* (Incense of Spices) (Berlin, 1793). Following the style and pattern of the responsum literature, Berlin begins each responsum with the text said to have been composed by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century *halakic* authority, Rabbi Asher ben Yeḥiel, or his contemporaries; subsequent to each text Berlin has his own annotation. See the articles cited in note 3 above.
11. See note 1 and 7.
12. *Besamim Rosh*, pp. 73a-b, siman 225, regarding the question whether the majority can compel the minority. Berlin's immediate answer is "indeed in every matter the minority is compelled to act like the majority." However, at the end of his discussion he states his opinion to the contrary enlisting in his aid both the Bible and the Talmud.
13. *Mishle 'Asaf*, II, p. 26a, ch. 24, vs. 10, in the commentary. For a similar technique, see Satanow's *Divre Rivot* (Matters of Controversy) [Berlin, 1793], p. 43b, and compare Shmuel Werses, "Joseph Perl Satiric Methods," *Story and Source* (Ramat Gan, Israel, 1971) pp. 16-17 (Hebrew), regarding the use of the latter technique by some other Hebrew writers of the period. I have discussed this subject fully in my study *Isaac Satanow — A Heretic and a Believer*, notes 134-142, and related text.
14. Carl Lotus Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven, 1959), pp. 29-31: "But, if we examine the foundations of their faith, we find that at every turn the *Philosophers* betray their debt to medieval thought without being aware of it."
15. F. Laḥover, "Harambam Ve-ha-Haskalah Ha'Ivrit Be-Reshitah" (Maimonides and the Early Hebrew Haskalah), *Moznayim*, III (No. 1-6, Tishre-Adar Bet, 1938-39), pp. 539-546, cites a basic difference between Maimonides and the early *maskilim*, yet admits the former's impact on the *maskilim*. See also Joseph Schechter, "The Attitude of the Haskalah Generation and Our Generation Toward Maimonides," *Limude Ha-Yahadut Ba-Hinuch Ha-'Al Yesodi* (Judaic Studies in Post-Elementary Education) (Tel Aviv, 1968), pp. 107-110 (Hebrew), and Barzilay, "The Ideology of the Berlin Haskalah," pp. 4-7. Solomon Maimon, who owes his surname to Maimonides (Moshe ben Maimon), relates his admiration and spiritual indebtedness to Maimonides in his autobiography *The Life of Solomon Maimon* (Tel Aviv, 1953), pp. 260-261 (Hebrew). Solomon Maimon is one of the *maskilim* who published commentaries on Maimonides' works: *Moreh Nevukim* (Guide for the Perplexed) (Berlin, 1791); and Mendelssohn's commentary on *Milot Ha-Higayon* (Words of Logic), first published in 1761. Quotations from Maimonides in the writings of the *maskilim* and their application to the furtherance of the goals of Haskalah are abundant in the literature. See James H. Lehmann, "Maimonides, Mendelssohn and the Me'asfim (:): Philosophy and the Biographical Imagination in the Early Haskalah," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, XX (1975), pp. 87-108.
16. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 9b, ch. 5, vs. 18. *Ḥokmah*, Satanow writes in his commentary, is an inclusive term for the various sciences such as astronomy, mechanics, optics, law, etc. (Cf. his definition in his edition of *Milot Ha-Higayon* [Berlin, 1795], p. 41b). *Ḥokmah* is depicted also as philosophy (*Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 8b, ch. 5, vs. 7).
17. Cf. Jacob Klatzkin, *Ozar Ha-munaḥim Ha-filosofiyim* (Thesaurus Philosophicus), I (Berlin, 1928), pp. 290-299, the definition of *Ḥokmah*; J. Steinberg, *Mishpaṭ Ha'urim* (Lexicon zum Urtexte des Alten Testaments) (Tel Aviv, 1937<sup>10</sup>), pp. 229-230.
18. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 12a, ch. 6, vs. 16: Both fear (of God) and *Ḥokmah* lead man to perfection.

The author emphasizes the interdependence of the two by citing the saying from the *Ethics of the Fathers*: Where there is no *Yir'ah* there is no *Ḥokmah*.

19. *Mishle 'Asaf*, II, p. 69a, ch. 64, vs. 1 (commentary): "Torah and wisdom are twin sisters."
20. *Ibid.*
21. See Satanow, *Holek Tamim* (He that Walks Upright) (Berlin, 1795), p. 6b: There is no belief or knowledge in the Mosaic religion which contradicts reason. Satanow advises his reader to adhere to the concept of the fear of God and not to be apprehensive of the supposed risks and pitfalls cited by the ignorant, haters of wisdom, to be associated with *Ḥokmah* (*ibid.*, p. 1a). In the title page of his *'Imre Binah*, Satanow refers to tradition and investigation (*Qabalah* and *Ḥaqirah*, respectively) as twin sisters.
22. Cf. Barzilay, "The Ideology," pp. 1-7.
23. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, pp. 7b-8a, ch. 4, vs. 20; II, p. 8b, ch. 8, vs. 18.
24. *Ibid.*, I, p. 8a, ch. 5, vs. 3.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 11a-b, ch. 6, vs. 10.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 9b, ch. 5, vs. 18 (commentary): "and he said (i.e., the author of the text) that the perfect one (—man) would not be able to know him (—God), blessed be He, but through wisdom, the latter being an inclusive term for the various sciences such as ( . . . ) astronomy ( . . . ) mechanics ( . . . ) optics ( . . . )" etc. Cf. Naphtali Herz Wessely's *Devre Shalom Ve-Emet* (Words of Peace and Truth), I (Berlin, 1782), pp. 1b-4a on the dependence of *Torat ha-Shem* (The Law of God) on *Torat Ha-Adam* (The Law of Man) and see my study "Naphtali Herz Wessely's Attitude Toward the Jewish Religion as a Mirror of a Generation in Transition," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, XXVI (3, 1974), pp. 236-237, notes 56-60 and related text.
27. *Ibid.*, II, p. 61a, ch. 56, vs. 1, (commentary): "( . . . ) and wisdom ( . . . ) will probe faith whether it has been founded truthfully or falsely." Similarly, it appears that wisdom outweighs *Yir'ah*; thus although *Yir'ah* precedes *Ḥokmah* (for one is supposed to fear God, namely, to observe the Torah and the *mitzvot* first), the latter has an advantage over the former in importance. For *Ḥokmah* — Satanow writes — is in the essence of *Yir'ah* and is its goal and objective (*ibid.*, I, p. 1b, ch. 1, vs. 10). In the same vein, *Yir'ah* may increase one's days, but *Ḥokmah* should increase one's eternal life (*ibid.*, II, p. 12a, ch. 12, vs. 6). The twin sisters are no longer identical twins now in Satanow's mind; *Ḥokmah*, by far, had outweighed *Yir'ah*, thus revealing the author's philosophy of life in its transformation.
28. See my study "The Impact of Deism on the Hebrew Literature of the Enlightenment in Germany," *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, VI, 1, (Fall, 1972), pp. 35-59.
29. See my book *Moshe Mendelssohn: Be-Kavle Masoret* (Moses Mendelssohn: Bonds of Tradition) (Tel Aviv, 1972) pp. 16-19, 78-88.
30. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 25a, ch. 14, vs. 9 (commentary): "The best of donkeys needs a bridle and curb, and likewise the most worthy of men needs a religion."
31. *Ibid.*, I, p. 51.b, ch. 38, vs. 20.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 50b, ch. 38, vs. 2; p. 84a, ch. 47, vs. 2.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 84a, ch. 47, vs. 1.
34. *Ibid.*, II, p. 10b, ch. 10, vs. 18.
35. *Ibid.*, I, 59a, ch. 32, vs. 26; p. 55b, ch. 31, vs. 13; p. 84a, ch. 47, vs. 2.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 84a, ch. 47, vs. 2.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 23a, ch. 13, vs. 14.
38. John Toland, *Christianity Not Mysterious* (London, 1702), in the title page: "A Treatise Shewing, That there is nothing in the Gospel Contrary to Reason, Nor Above it: And that no Christian Doctrine can be properly call'd A Mystery."
39. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, pp. 84a-b, ch. 47, vs. 2. This argumentation is common with the deists, although in reverse roles, namely, that Judaism (and paganism) have been quite instrumental in the corruption of the pure form of Christianity since the latter is founded on Judaism, and Judaism and its Scriptures have been corrupted by the priests (Cf. my study "The Impact of Deism," cited above). Similar references to the negative influence of *Galut* on the Jewish people, its language and literature are abundant in the writings of the *maskilim* (See my article

“The Attitude of the First *Maskilim* to the Hebrew Language,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Jewish Studies*, II (1974), pp. 83-97.) Isaac Euchel alludes to the negative impact of the Christian customs on Judaism employing the ironic and satiric twist: The Christians observe certain Jewish customs; however, these customs are not found in the early Jewish *halakic* sources such as the Talmud (. . .) (“The Letter of Meshullam ben Uriyyah Ha-’Eshtemo’i,” *Hame’assef*, VI (1790), p. 45 [Hebrew]). For further discussion, see my study “Isaac Euchel: Tradition and Change,” *Journal of Jewish Studies*, XXVI (1-2, Spring-Autumn, 1975), pp. 151-167; XXVII 1 (Spring, 1976), pp. 54-70. For similar use by Saul Berlin, see my article “The Religious Reforms,” cited in note 3 above, notes 36 and 37.

40. See my book *Moshe Mendelssohn: Be-Kavle Masoret*, pp. 11, 16-20, 24, 78-87.
41. *Mishle ’Asaf*, I, pp. 55a-b, ch. 31, vss. 5-10.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*, II, p. 20a, ch. 18, vs. 16 (commentary): “The priests of every nation would arouse hatred among nations thinking that God wants them alone, and as to those who profess other beliefs, it is obligatory to kill and annihilate (them).” *Ibid.*, vs. 17 (commentary): “The said priests would give the nation a poisonous drink, i.e., false ideas so that they would profess the hatred of (the other) religion.”
44. *Ibid.*, I, p. 77a, ch. 42, vs. 16 (commentary): “(. . .) alluding to blood accusation(s) that the Christians, under the advice of their priests, libeled falsely against the Jews, and killed many of them cruelly in every generation.”
45. *Ibid.*, II, p. 44a, ch. 39, vs. 9. In the deistic literature this argument is prevalent; see for instance John Toland, “The Primitive Constitution of the Christian Church,” *A Collection of Several Pieces*, II, (London, 1726), pp. 171, 172, 174; J.J. Rousseau, *The Creed of a Priest of Savoy* (New York, 1957), pp. 54-55.
46. *Mishle ’Asaf*, II, p. 44a, ch. 39, vs. 9.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 47a, ch. 42 (text): “(6) Love the members of your faith, (but) do not hate those whose faith is different; (7) For one God had created them, and on one God, in various names, they call; (8) They would worship Him in various ways, as their fathers have taught them; (9) With different gifts they would welcome one king.” It is interesting to note that Satanow does not have any commentary here, for the text itself overtly expresses the author’s ideas. *Ibid.*, I, p. 55b, ch. 31, vs. 12 (commentary): “He (God) has established man to be social by nature, i.e., to be helping one another (. . .) and the true religion should help nature to do good to human beings where she is not able to.” The parable of the true ring appears in Lessing’s *Nathan der Weise* as well as in world literature. A similar parable of the true precious stone appears in Ibn Verga’s *Shevet Yehudah* (Sceptre of Judah) (Jerusalem, n.d.), p. 66.
48. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 285-286; Charles Blount, *The Oracles of Reason* (London, 1693), pp. 9-10; John Toland, “The Primitive Constitution of the Christian Church,” p. 174; Matthew Tindal, *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, I (London, 1730), pp. 192, 200,370; Anthony Collins, *A Discourse of the Grounds and Reason of the Christian Religion* (London, 1737), p. 33; *ibid.*, first edition (London, 1724), pp. 82-83; Thomas Chubb, *The Previous Question with Regard to Religion* (London, 1725), p. 22; *idem*, *A Discourse on Miracles* (London, 1741).
49. *Mishle ’Asaf*, II, p. 51b, ch. 47, vs. 1 (commentary): Satanow uses the words “Ḥasidav ha-Gedolim,” *ḥasid* being a virtuous, or pious person.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 49b, ch. 50, vs. 22 (commentary): Should the elders believe that two times two is five, or that three together would make one (one abstract), then there should be no place for their view, and no tradition can deny reason which, to Satanow, is the sole criterion for examination and testing. However, those miracles and prodigies cited in the Scriptures and in the Talmud are “ta’alumat ḥokmah” and not contradictions to reason, and thus it is obligatory to believe in them. Note that subtle way in which the author refers to the Christian doctrine of Trinity in the apparent, down-to-earth — and thus disguised — context of a simple, unquestionable mathematical problem.
51. *Moshe Mendelssohn: Be-Kavle Masoret*, pp. 85-86; Mendelssohn rejects the Christian reliance on miracles and prodigies, yet accepts some form of reliance on prodigies in Judaism through subtle argumentation saying that it is a positive law to follow a prophet who proves his authenticity by performing prodigies — though one is not obliged to believe in the prodigies; by the same token, following this prophet would not necessarily mean that the prodigies are true

(Moses Mendelssohn, *Yerushalayim, Ketavim Qetanim* [Jerusalem & Small Writings] [Tel Aviv, 1947], p. 200).

52. See note 50.
53. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II (New York, 1959), A.C. Fraser's edition, pp. 423-426.
54. See "The Impact of Deism" and my article "Intimations of Religious Reform in the Hebrew Haskalah Literature," *Jewish Social Studies*, XXXII (1, January 1970), pp. 5-6
55. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 60b, ch. 33, vs. 11. The same idea is to be found in vol. II, p. 27a, ch. 25, vs. 14.
56. *Ibid.*, II, p. 15b, ch. 15, vs. 11.
57. *Ibid.*, I, p. 60a, ch. 33, vs. 7.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 60b, ch. 33, vs. 8.
59. *Ibid.*: see also "Intimations of Religious Reform," p. 6, note 18. Concerning the talmudic expression *cf. Shabbat*, 112b.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 47a-b, ch. 32, vs. 5: *Yir'ah* is equated with morality; see also p. 1b, ch. 1, vs. 9, and vol. II, p. 13b, ch. 13, vs. 3. Against religious coercion: *ibid.*, II, pp. 15a-b, ch. 15, vs. 10 — "faith cannot be gotten by coercion but by persuasion of reason." There are also references and allusions to utilitarianism (*ibid.*, p. 7b, ch. 4, vs. 18).
61. Satanow, like his fellow *maskilim*, quotes mistaken citations from the *piyyuṭim* and *seliḥot* which are made to look ridiculous (*ibid.*, I, p. 94b, ch. 53, vs. 12; the author wittily relates the story of the man who prayed that God should open his womb; *ibid.*, pp. 24b-25a, ch. 14, vs. 3; *ibid.*, p. 6b, ch. 4, vs. 4: Some *piyyuṭim* bring about an erroneous understanding of the deity; *ibid.*, II, p. 57b, ch. 53, vs. 4: Some *piyyuṭim* are blasphemous). On the *pilpul*: *ibid.*, I, p. 10b, ch. 6, vs. 2; *ta'anivot* and *siggufim*: *ibid.*, p. 25b, ch. 14, vs. 12.
62. *Ibid.*, I, p. 30a, ch. 17, vs. 4; p. 54a, ch. 30, vs. 19; II, pp. 46b-47a, ch. 42, vs. 1.
63. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 61a-b, ch. 34, vss. 1-3.
64. *Ibid.*, vs. 3, pp. 25a-b, ch. 14, vs. 10, vol. II, p. 21b, ch. 19, vs. 20 (commentary): Some of the *seyagim* were enacted, according to Satanow, just because of the light-minded, so that they would not be as close to the essence of religion; thus the good ones, the observant people, have to suffer because of the wicked; see also *ibid.*, vss. 22-23.
65. Satanow employs a metaphor of the webs and the flies: the weak ones will stumble in them and will be captured while the strong ones will tear them and escape. In the commentary, the webs are said to be the social ordinances and the state laws ("Ha-Ḥuqqim ha-nimusiym") — indeed not the divine laws — which are being bypassed by the strong ones (*ibid.*, II, p. 50b, ch. 46, vss. 1-2). Against the background of his views on secondary laws and his views on the *seyagim* (see note 64), I am inclined to think that Satanow is constantly, yet subtly, aiming at destroying the foundation of the religious ordinances and their all-encompassing, obligatory nature. In addition, he advocates adherence to the social and state customs when he cites the popular quotation: Should you arrive at a city, adopt its custom (*Ibid.*, p. 57a, ch. 52, vs. 22). *Cf.* Euchel's use of this idea as the central theme of his "Letters of Meshullam," *Hame'assef*, VI (1790), pp. 40, 43, 45-50, and my study on Isaac Euchel (cited in note 39 above), p. 62, note 118 and its related text.
66. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 2a, ch. 1, vs. 13 (text): "Hadrikem bederek zedaqah ve'emunah, horem netivot ha-Ḥaokma veba-'Emet" (Instruct them in the way of righteousness and faith, teach them the paths of wisdom and truth). In the commentary the author refers to the two kinds of perfection discussed in this chapter, namely, *Yir'ah* — represented in the text by *Zedaqah*, and *'Emunah*, which is the Torah and the *mitzvot* — and *Hokmah*, represented here by *Hokmah* and *'Emet*. The biblical parallelism, I think, serves only as a textual facade, so that the author may portray *Hokmah* and *Yir'ah* as complementing each other, or as a gate within a gate, one leading to the other. However he does not depict the two as identical. Therefore it is safe to conclude that the selection of the terminology in the text is mainly dictated not by the literary needs of the text, i.e., biblical parallelism, but by the exegetical objectives of the commentary. It is, then, the *lineal* connotation of the terms employed here rather than the *parallel* one which opens new avenues to the understanding of Satanow and his *Mishle 'Asaf*. Thus the textual parallelism, as viewed through the commentary, serves as an ironic contrast rather than as a comparison between equals. *Cf.* Mordechai Schnaber's distinction between faith and truth, in his book *Shelosh 'Esreh Yesode Ha-Torah* (Thirteen Principles of Torah) (Altona?, 1792), p.

2b, and see my study “Mordechai Gumpel Schnaber: The First Religious Reform Theoretician of the Hebrew Haskalah in German,” *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, LXIV (4, 1974), p. 310.

67. *Mishle 'Asaf*, II, p. 18a, ch. 17, vs. 7 (commentary): “Shemirat Ha-mitzvah u-mezi'ut ha-Ḥokmah hem shne hafakim” (The observance of the *mitzvah* and the existence of *Ḥokmah* are two opposites). It follows that for the sake of the observance of the *mitzvot* one is better off not pursuing *Ḥokmah* at all. What Satanow does not say — yet it may be a logical and textual conclusion — is that he who adheres fully to the concept of *Ḥokmah* may find himself negligent in the observance of *mitzvot* as a result of the very nature of *Ḥokmah*. It appears that *Yir'ah* (namely, the observance of the Torah and the *mitzvot* — see *ibid.*, I, p. 2a, ch. 1, vs. 13, cf. note 66) and *Ḥokmah* do not complement each other as Satanow was trying consciously to have us believe, but rather contradict each other.
68. *Ibid.*, I, p. 4b, ch. 3, vs. 1 (text): “Mivṭaḥ va-'Alilah nifgashu, beḥirah u-gezerah nashaqu” (Trust and action met, choice and decree kissed). In the commentary, Satanow explains that one cannot trust his master fully, that he — the master — should provide him food, and at the same time look for the food by himself; for by so doing he shows that he does not fully trust his master. Similarly, free choice and pre-destination contradict each other. From the second part of the commentary we may deduce that the discussion is in the realm of the divine, thus the master is God, and the trust is the trust in God. Complete trust in God seems to be contradictory to human nature. Satanow suggests a compromise in the second verse: God actually desires this contradiction and “makes peace between them.” For one is supposed to have a complete trust in God like a righteous man, and at the same time continue his material activities as though he has no trust in God (verse 3). In the final analysis, Satanow's premise, namely, that trust in God and human activities somehow contradict each other, prevails. Even if the author does not wish to advise his readers not to trust God, he does indeed create some skepticism as to the possibility of a complete trust in God.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 7a, ch. 4, vss. 13-15; Satanow's treatment of these verses is subtle: he first advises the enlightened ones (maskile ha-'Am) not to speak regarding the divine out of their own independent thinking, for the only way to know God (and thus to speak of Him) is through His creation; they may, though, repeat what they have received from their ancestors, namely, tradition. (Following this, the author refers his readers to ch. 19 vs. 1 where the opposite is argued; thus he causes confusion and skepticism). Satanow's conclusion: “God would not accuse you if you should not learn to fear Him in things which are spoken by mouth alone, which have no sense” (commentary, vs. 15). Satanow's use of the double negative is intriguing; for what he is actually supposed to say, in light of the previous verses, is that God indeed will accuse the one who would learn to fear him through senseless things. It appears that the author is quite eager to leave with his reader the main clause: “God would not accuse you if you should not learn to fear him (. . .).” The rest is lost in the process of relating the double negative sentence to the ideas he cited before. Further support to our interpretation could be drawn from the text of verse 15, which says in effect that man is not to blame if he is not able to fear God as a result of the limitations which God himself had put on that individual.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 6a, ch. 3, vs. 25 (commentary): “There is no love in the world which is caused by the love of the object alone, for self-love is the cause so that the one who loves should benefit something out of his love (. . .). And also all those who worship God lovingly will love Him, blessed be He, for the love of the love of their own good self in this (world) and in the coming one, materially or spiritually.”
71. *Ethics of the Fathers*, (5:16): “Kol 'ahavah she-hi teluyah be-davar, baṭel davar, beṭelah 'ahavah. Veshe-'enah teluyah be-davar, 'enah beṭelah le-'olam” (If love depends on some selfish end, when the end fails, love fails, but if it does not depend on a selfish end, it will never fail. — Translation by Judah Goldin, *The Living Talmud* [New York, 1957], p. 215).
72. *Ḥagigah*, p. 13a, citing Ben Sira.
73. *Mishle 'Asaf*, I, p. 8b, ch. 5, vs. 7 (text): “Look and examine his (God's) deed(s) in heaven above and on the earth below.” The author advises his readers to further their knowledge and understanding in the creation, and to leave nothing which is not checked and examined by human reason, be it earthly or heavenly. The choice of the words “ba-shamayim mima'al” (in heaven above) — as contrasted with “'al ha-'areṣ mi-taḥat” (and on the earth below) — seems to be intentional and meaningful. Human reason is held here as the supreme judge, and no one — not even God — is to be excluded from its scrutiny.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 25b, ch. 14, vs. 17 (text): “Should you become confused in the way of reason, do not betray the people of faith.” Commentary: “Should skepticism and confusion in your faith rise as a result of investigation, do not betray your faith because of that.” And in the commentary of

the following verse: “Do not run to sin because of the confusion which came up in your inquiry (. . .).”

75. *Ibid.*, vs. 17 (commentary): “(. . .) for this is the way of inquiry, that one would not realize its truth until after one had become confused and skeptical.” *Ibid.*, p. 10b, ch. 5, vs. 23: “Mevukot” are depicted as “a flowing fountain” and the “source of wisdom” — as a necessary stage in the process of learning. See also *Ibid.*, II, pp. 39b-40a, ch. 35. Although *Mevukah* may mean also amazement, astonishment, Satanow uses the word together with *Safeq* (doubt). Therefore, there could be no doubt as to the exact meaning of *Mevukot*.